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Private Property and Public Interest 
By Michael Monahan 
 
In this paper I explore the limitations of liberal political theory in relation to the notions of 
public property and public interest. I argue that the fundamentally atomistic and individualistic 
ontological foundations of the liberal tradition preclude any coherent notion of public goods and 
public interest. 
 
Introduction  
Michael Powell, son of Secretary of State Colin Powell and former head of the Federal 
Communications Commission, once remarked: “The night after I was sworn in, I waited for a 
visit from the angel of the public interest. I waited all night, but she did not come” (Masher 
2002). Given that the protection of the public interest is part of the mandate of the very 
organization Powell chairs, his blithe dismissal of the very idea of public interest is highly 
significant, and more than a little bit troubling. Indeed, the FCC under Powell has sat mute while 
an already staggering media concentration has grown steadily worse. In radio alone, the 
number of companies in control of that medium has shrunk 30% since 1996, with one company, 
Clear Channel, now owning more than 1,200 stations nationwide (Copps 2003). Not all of this 
has occurred under Powell’s watch of course, but he is nevertheless remarkable for his explicit 
dismissal of any obligation to public good or interest. Not accidentally, at the same time that 
control of mass media, and thus public access to information, has become concentrated in the 
hands of fewer and fewer large corporations, the public goods related to media, which would 
include not only the airwaves and the digital spectrum, but also the physical spaces occupied by 
billboards, posters, and so on, are less and less in the control of the public, and increasingly in 
the control of these same corporate agents. 
I will argue that this trend is in many important ways a result of a limitation of the 
dominant way of theorizing about the political that traces its roots to classical liberalism. More 
specifically, traditional liberal ontology, which is fundamentally atomistic and individualistic, has 
great difficulty capturing what a “public” might even be, let alone what goods or interests might 
pertain to such an entity. While there are certainly means available within this dominant 
tradition to at least partially address these problems, this limited ability to theorize “the public” 
will continue to facilitate and even obfuscate political failures of the sort described above. 
Therefore, what is needed is, first, an exposure of this limitation, and, second, the generation 
of new ways of approaching an understanding of public or common goods and our relationship 
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to them. This paper is primarily an effort of the former, though I will make some gestures 
towards the more promising theoretical directions for the constructive project. 
 
Liberal Individualism 
The object of my critique is that body of political theory that I am here referring to as 
“liberal individualism.” It would include the political theories of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, 
J.S. Mill, John Rawls and Robert Nozick most decidedly, and at least some interpretations and 
elements of Immanuel Kant’s and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s as well.
1 
Perhaps more 
importantly, it is the default understanding of the political world in the majority of Western 
“liberal” democracies, particularly in the U.S. It is the root of what has come to be known as 
neoliberalism, which implicitly, and often explicitly, informs the justification for the policies and 
institutions of globalization, deregulation, and free trade. The relevant feature of this body of 
theory in the present context is its account of the relationship between individual agents and 
each other, the state, and the material world. I am interested in exploring how the ontology of 
liberal political theory conditions and ultimately limits the very possibility of a viable concept of 
public or common goods.  
In the interest of brevity, I offer the following general account with the understanding that 
it is not meant to capture any particular theory or theorist, but is intended only to carve out a 
broad, and necessarily imprecise, conception of political agency. Nevertheless, it does 
accurately represent the common features of the classical liberal cannon. Liberal individualism, 
as I am using the term, conceives of political agency as fundamentally atomistic. That is, 
social/political subjects are each self-contained and ontologically discreet political atoms. For 
each and every subject, that subject’s fundamental ontological status can be described without 
reference to anything beyond itself. Each exists, as a subject, prior to any social interaction, 
such that social practices, bodies, and institutions can only be understood as the sum of these 
discreet individual components, and nothing more. All of these subjects or agents are 
understood as free-floating in a kind of social void, until they interact with each other through 
exchanges of goods, which in turn are conceptually, though not always literally, external to our 
agency itself. In other words, there is a hard and distinct division between what is internal to a 
given agent, in the sense of arising from, expressing, or being a necessary component of the 
self, and what is external, in the sense of being separate, distinct, contingent, and incidental to 
the self. The self, in short, is understood to be coherent and intelligible as such, without 
reference to any larger social or intersubjective context.  
This in turn means that individuals exist logically, if not chronologically, prior to the social 
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world, which is itself understood to be the result of the collected individual wills of these discreet 
agents. The social world arises out of these mutual exchanges of material and non-material 
goods between these atomistic individual agents. Indeed, to the extent that liberal theories have 
an anthropological project, that project is to explain how and why society came to be from some 
primordial pre-social state of nature. To the extent that these theories have a normative project, 
it is to explain the rationality of social restraint on individual interests and action purely in light of 
those individual interests. Within this framework, our principal means of interaction with the 
material world, and with each other, is through the acquisition and exchange of private property. 
Thus, we, as subjects, exist primarily as bearers, or potential bearers, of property, including 
such property as our own bodies, our rights, and our privacy. We interact with other agents 
through the mediation of these fundamentally external goods in the form of explicit or implicit 
contract, which is here understood broadly as any exchange of material and/or non-material 
goods for mutual benefit. All of our obligations, indeed the totality of our interactions with others, 
should thus be described in contractual terms. The harm of murder lies in the seizure of the 
property of life, the harm in discrimination lies in the curtailment of the property opportunity, and 
so on. Political being, in this view, amounts to the rational pursuit of self-interest through the 
accumulation and exchange of material and non-material goods.  
Again, the details and contours of this general account will vary from theory to theory, 
but this basic underlying ontology is common to them all. What is important for the present 
project is that any social body or polity must always be understood as fundamentally reducible 
to its constitutive components, which are, in this context, atomistic individual subjects. At the 
end of the day, any social body can be understood as nothing more than a collection of 
individual agents engaging in explicit and implicit, and often highly sophisticated, exchanges of 
goods. The public is thus an amalgam of individuals, and public interest is collective individual 
interest. Ultimately, this means that all social phenomena can only truly be intelligible from an 
individual perspective, because any social entity, when it is placed under analytic scrutiny, 
reduces to individuals. 
 
Property: Private and Public 
Since all social phenomena within this theoretical framework are properly understood as 
individual phenomena, and more specifically as individual exchanges of goods, any 
investigation of the status of social phenomena, such as the nature of public goods or public 
interest, must be understood in the context of private, individual property. In terms of the specific 
relation to these external goods, they can only properly be understood as “ours” to the extent 
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that we are capable, as individual agents, of appropriating and alienating them. That is, if we are 
to understand some good as our private property, we must be able to dispose of it as we see fit. 
If, for any reason, I am prevented from alienating my property, then it cannot rightly be 
understood as mine. Within the context of liberal individualism, any mention of the inalienable 
must always be understood in a somewhat ironic fashion. The inalienable rights enshrined in the 
U.S. constitution are not inalienable in any necessary or ontological sense. If they were, there 
would be no need to mention them in the construction of our legal institutions. Indeed, such 
rights are understood as guaranteed by the state in exchange for certain obligations, such as 
obedience to the law, on the part of the individuals who make up that state. Life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness can be, and indeed were, alienated from significant portions of the U.S. 
population, and there are those who would argue that they continue to be alienated today. All of 
this in turn means that the limits of one’s capacity to alienate one’s property describes the limits 
of one’s freedom. The more I have to exchange, in other words, the more I am able to satisfy 
my goals, desires, and interests. Limitations on an individual’s capacity to alienate his or her 
property may be justified by appeal to the rights or safety of others, but they must always be 
understood in the strictest sense as an abrogation of freedom.  
Problems arise immediately when this approach is applied to any notion of public or 
common goods and interests. Take, for example, a necessary commodity, like water. If a 
community, which must be understood solely as a collection of individual agents, lives near a 
large body of water, what are the means by which it may be considered a common good? 
Understood on an individual level, one’s relation to a given object or resource is binary: either 
one owns it or one does not. If one owns something, one may dispose of it as one sees fit, and 
if one does not, one must seek permission for the appropriation of that good or object, and 
typically offer something in exchange for that privilege. This is the heart of the privacy of private 
property. If a good is understood as public rather than private, this binary relationship is no 
longer possible. Should I find myself living near a pond that is supposed to be common 
property, I may use it to a limited extent for recreation purposes, but there are myriad possible 
uses from which I am prohibited. I cannot, in other words, do to it whatever I wish, as I may with 
genuine private property. Public goods may not be easily alienated, nor may any particular 
individual prevent others from using or even harming them. The basic liberal individualistic 
model for understanding the relation between individual agents and the external world, that of 
property, begins rapidly to collapse. If I, as an individual, relate to that which is external to me 
through the appropriation and alienation of property, and I relate to other agents through the 
mutual exchange of property, then all of these interactions must be subject to an accurate 
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description in purely individual terms. That is, I, as an individual, must be able to undertake or 
reject these relations as I see fit. Public property complicates this relation, which in turn means 
that all public property must be understood as contrary to individual liberty, or that all public 
property is ultimately incoherent, or perhaps both—i.e., the incoherent concept of public 
property is contrary to freedom. 
 
The Incoherence of Public Property 
One may perhaps account for public property within a liberal individualist framework by 
extending the notion of private property to every member of the relevant polity, such that the 
common property becomes our collective private property. The problem with this is that no 
individual may relate to that public good in the usual way one relates to private property, since 
one may not simply appropriate or alienate it as one sees fit. Returning to the example of water, 
if I, as an individual, owned the pond, then I could very well use it all to water my pumpkin patch, 
or dump sulfur in it, or make it my personal piranha farm. By way of comparison, I can take my 
television and smash it to bits with a sledgehammer because it is mine, just as I  
can do whatever I wish with things that are mine.
2 
If others are in a position to prevent me from 
doing this without appeal to their own private property or personal safety, then it is clearly not 
really my private property at all. Even if they can prevent me from disposing of my property 
through such appeals, this prevention must be understood as an externally imposed limit on my 
liberty as regards that property. 
However, if someone is in a position to justly prevent me from smashing my television 
without such appeals to their own property or interests, then that television cannot really be my 
property. Likewise, if someone is in a position to justly prevent me from dumping sulfur in the 
pond, strictly because they don’t want their pond ruined, then the pond is not really my property. 
Nor can the pond be understood as any other’s private property, since they are constrained in 
their use of it as well. The pond is therefore not mine, nor is there any other individual to whom it 
clearly belongs. In order for public property to truly be public, therefore, it cannot be a simple 
numeric extension of private property.  
What are the options in light of this problem? One could take the common good and 
divide it equally such that each agent privately owns some fraction of the good. I, as an 
individual, could therefore be said to “own” a certain amount, say five liters, of the pond, which 
I may use however I wish. This may have some merit in relation to goods which are easily 
divisible, and for which the divided parts are distinct, but common goods are seldom like this. 
What I do with my five liters of pond can greatly impact others’ use of it. I might, for example, 
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dump huge amounts of chlorine in it. There are also many public goods that simply cannot be 
understood as divisible in this way—like airwaves. Most goods that it seems reasonable to 
treat as common property simply are not subject to divisibility in a way that makes this solution 
viable.  
 
The Institutional Custodian  
One response to this problem is to grant custody of the public good to some institution 
that in turn stands as the proxy private owner of that good—e.g., a public water commission or 
park service. Indeed this seems to be the most promising response, and is in point of fact the 
solution most frequently employed. The institution becomes a de facto, and usually de jure, 
agent, which can relate to the good or object as if it were private property. The principal 
difference is that the institutional agent is not pursuing its own private interest, but rather the 
public interest. Returning to the pond example, if an institution were created that owns the pond, 
and may thus dispose of that pond as it sees fit, then it is that institution that I must approach to 
use the pond, and that I may have to compensate for that use. I, as an individual with a certain 
interest in the pond, must trust that the institution will protect my interest through its ownership. 
Of course, the pond is still the private property of the institutional agent, which means that so-
called public property, despite all this, remains a peculiar kind of private property.  
There are two further problems with this solution. The first involves the relationship of 
private agents to this public good itself. Since the commonality of the good in such cases lies 
solely in the fact that it is the private property of an institution ostensibly protecting the public 
interest, it remains fundamentally the property of another. That is, public goods are always 
already not mine in the sense that we usually relate to what is mine. We interact with the 
institution as if it were another agent, which means that the good or property in question is at 
root the property someone else. There is thus no sense of ownership, and certainly no sense of 
stewardship, in relation to public goods on the part of those individuals who comprise the public. 
There is at best a kind of irony inherent in the notion of public goods that are owned by a private 
individual, and it is one with significant implications. Because the public goods are in fact the 
private goods of an institution, we relate to them in the same way that we relate to any private 
property not in our possession: with indifference at best, and resentment or envy at worst. If 
another’s property is not causing me any harm, then I ignore it. Indeed, this is at the heart of 
liberal conceptions of social justice. On the other hand, if I understand that property to be 
causing me some harm or indicative of my own inadequacies, then I resent or envy it. In relation 
to this notion of public property, indifference is often manifested in the public tendency to ignore 
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threats to public goods until it is too late, such as in the cases of the mass media, and certainly 
the natural environment. At the same time, resentment may also be directed toward the 
institution, which is seen as usurping the property rights of the individual. The present debate 
over the use of snowmobiles in Yellowstone exemplifies this latter phenomenon perfectly. Both 
sides of the issue see the park as theirs in important ways, and see the National Park Service 
as limiting their ability to use it as they see fit. Agent A is not allowed to ride her snowmobile as 
much as she would like, and agent B has his tranquil hike ruined by noisy snowmobiles. 
Regulation of public goods, therefore, is understood immediately as an imposition on the 
freedom of individual agents, who see their ability to access the public good as if it were private 
property being limited by the institutional owner.  
There is a related concern involving the situation of the institutional agent within a 
capitalist context. In order to ensure its existence, the institution must be self-sustaining. This is 
difficult even when the public is indifferent to the good in question, and nearly impossible when 
they are resentful. The appropriation of state funds, for example, becomes contingent upon the 
institution’s ability to demonstrate the value of the good to those in a position to deliver such 
funds. In the U.S., this increasingly means corporate entities and interests. In other words, the 
institution has in its private possession some good or resource which requires funds to maintain. 
In order to secure those funds, it must offer something in exchange; it must engage in contract. 
The public is unlikely to support the institution, since they do not understand themselves to be 
connected to the good or resource in the appropriate way, which is always understood to be that 
of private property. Thus, they are likely to either take it for granted, or seek to undermine its 
support. In other words, they will either be indifferent to the institution or resent it. As a result, 
the access to the good or service comes to be available in direct proportion to the monetary 
support one is able to offer. In the case of environmental resources, this means petroleum, 
logging, and mining interests, and in the case of the public airwaves, this means corporate 
media interests.  
The other important issue with this conception of public property involves the 
theoretical account of public interest. According to this model, the institutional owner of the 
public property is entrusted to use that property to pursue public instead of private interest. But 
how is one to make sense of a public interest within the framework of liberal individualism? If 
social entities, such as the public, are only ever properly understood as collected individual 
interests, then what sense can be made of a genuinely public interest? Insofar as the public 
arises out of contract, out of an exchange of goods, then the public interest must be nothing 
more than the collected individual exchanges of goods. This means that ultimately public 
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interest as such simply does not exist, there is only a kind of median or average of the 
individual interests of those who participate in the exchange of goods constitutive of a given 
polity.  
In this light, Powell’s statement regarding angels begins to make perfect sense. If all 
interests are ultimately private, then the public interest must also operate as a private interest. 
The use of institutional ownership makes this clear. If we cannot commonly own some property, 
such as the airwaves, then we must create some institution to serve as proxy private owner. If 
that institution is charged with serving the public interest, as is the case with the FCC, then it is 
prohibited from serving its own private interests. But there is no individual agent to serve as the 
public interest. Thus, charged with serving the public interest, Powell waits expectantly for that 
public to make its interests known, and it never does. There can only ever be individual interests 
and, given the market realities of the mass media, this means that one is best off promoting the 
interests of those who are in the best position to sustain the institution.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
All of this suggests an inability on the part of liberal individualism to describe any 
relationship to the material world other than private property. Attempts to account for common 
goods within this framework are tenuous at best, and ultimately serve to distance the public 
from the public goods themselves. This has been especially damaging in the context of mass 
media. As Powell’s statement regarding angels makes clear, liberal individualism has a difficult 
time even accounting for public goods as such, let alone establishing institutions to govern their 
access. All agents must be described in purely atomistic terms, or the distinction between 
internal and external dissolves. Put simply, if we lose the binary distinction between the mine 
and the not mine, we lose the distinction between the me and the not me. Public goods, in 
threatening this internal/external distinction, can thus be understood as a direct threat to the 
integrity of individual agents as individual agents. Individual interests and private property are 
very easily accounted for, but public interests and common property cannot fit within this 
atomistic framework without doing it irreparable damage. One response to this is to deny the 
very existence of such interests and goods, as Powell seems to suggest. Another is to reject 
this atomistic framework.  
Liberal individualism cannot account for public goods because it must treat everything as 
some variety of private property. This limitation is a direct result of its commitment to an 
atomistic ontology that understands political agency in purely individualistic terms. Within this 
context, private property is an all-or-nothing proposition. Either something is my property or it 
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isn’t, and if it isn’t, then I either have no meaningful interest in it or my interests are being 
thwarted by some other, who is the owner of that property. What is needed, therefore, is a way 
of conceptualizing agency itself that is based more on relationships than possessions. Our 
ontology must view our sociality as constitutive of our agency, rather than incidental to it. 
Instead of basing all human interaction on what are fundamentally economic models involving 
exchanges of goods and services between atomistic units, any meaningful conception of public 
goods will require a theory of agency that is itself radically social instead of individualistic. In 
other words, the commitment to a distinct divide between the internal and external must be 
challenged and problematized, if not abandoned altogether. We must make explicit the ways in 
which our own agency and identity is dependent upon and conditioned by not only our relations 
with other agents, but also our relations with larger social institutions and even the 
paradigmatically external world of material objects. In this way, the airwaves, for example, could 
be mine not in the sense that I may dispose of them as I see fit, but rather in the sense that the 
airwaves themselves, and the manner in which they are used, condition both the development 
and expression of my agency; in this way they are, literally, extensions of my agency, and their 
misappropriation or exploitation not only harms some external good, but actually harms me. In 
that sense, we are all “angels of the public interest.” Not in the sense of a collection of atomistic 
individuals pursuing our own interests, but as representatives of an intimately inter-and-intra-
connected social body that is ontologically more than the sum of its parts.  
 
Endnotes  
1. One might just as easily refer to this tradition as simply “liberalism,” but as I wish 
to stress the individualistic social ontology which serves as the foundation for classical 
liberalism, I have chosen this less common appellation. 
2. Of course, I cannot toss it into my neighbor’s yard, or drop it off a bridge onto a 
highway, but that is because these destinations are not mine, not because the television is 
not mine. 
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